



Track Two - The Pacific Dialogue: Security and Geopolitics in the Pacific

The University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji.

Monday 4th – Tuesday 5th December 2023

Outcomes Document

Executive Summary

- The inaugural Track Two ***Pacific Dialogue on Security and Geopolitics*** was convened at the University of the South Pacific from 4-5 December, 2023. The Pacific Dialogue was enabled through a generous grant from the British High Commission in Suva, Fiji.
- The Dialogue was attended by 20 participants from across the Pacific region including academics and researchers, civil society representatives, and government and regional officials attending in a non-official capacity. While a USP led initiative, the Dialogue was planned in consultation with the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat with a view to supporting the Pacific Islands Forum's call for strengthened collective action to proactively manage the regional security environment.
- The two-day Dialogue, conducted under Chatham House rules, saw frank and robust discussion on how rising geopolitical tensions are impacting the Pacific. Presentations and discussions focused on the geopolitical landscape in the region, the state of military activities in the Pacific, and Pacific responses to geostrategic dynamics.
- Participants agreed that there was a need for greater openness and candour in these matters, noting that this would contribute to building trust between the Pacific Island countries and their partners (both new and traditional). Participants recognized the value of more informed debate about military strategies and activities across the region, including the non-independent Pacific and especially Micronesia.
- The Dialogue was important in drawing attention to the way geopolitical agendas can negatively impact the Pacific's development and human security priorities, while also curtailing and constraining sovereignty.

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- Participants agreed there is a need for a Track Two mechanism within the regional architecture that directly contributes to regional and national conversations about security. It was agreed that the Pacific Dialogue could support the implementation of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, in particular its peace and security pillar, providing Forum processes with informed debate and critical analysis.
- Participants agreed that USP, as a CROP agency, has the credentials and legitimacy to convene and lead the Track Two Pacific Dialogue mechanism.

Introduction

Strategic competition in the Pacific Islands region has intensified significantly, leading the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in 2022 to highlight the impact of the ‘increasingly complex geopolitical environment’ on Member countries (Pacific Islands Forum, 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, 2022). The 2022 PIF Communique notes the wider geopolitical competition in the region and states that ‘the effective delivery of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent would require a fit for purpose “regional architecture”’ (PIF Communique 2022). Specifically, PIF Leaders agreed to the ‘inclusion of all relevant stakeholders’ and a commitment to ‘engagement and partnerships.’

In response to this call for inclusive mechanisms to address the security challenges the Pacific region is facing, the University of the South Pacific (USP) convened the inaugural Track Two ***Pacific Dialogue on Security and Geopolitics*** from 4-5 December 2023 at the Laucala campus, Suva, Fiji. This was enabled by a generous grant from the British High Commission and with the expert assistance of notetakers from the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Participants included academics and researchers, civil society representatives, and government and regional officials attending in a non-official capacity. Over the two-day Dialogue, conducted under Chatham House rules, discussion focused on the geopolitical landscape in the region, the state of military activities in the Pacific, and Pacific responses to geostrategic dynamics. The agenda of the Dialogue appears as **Appendix 1**. The Dialogue was attended by 20 participants from across the Pacific region. The list of participants appears as **Appendix 2**.

Welcome and Opening Remarks:

Professor Jito Vanualailai, USP Deputy Vice Chancellor Education

UK High Commissioner to Fiji, Dr Brian Jones

Dr Sandra Tarte, acting head, School of Law and Social Sciences, USP

Dr Tarte provided additional opening remarks to launch the inaugural Track Two *Pacific Dialogue: Security and Geopolitics in the Pacific*. Dr Tarte highlighted that the Pacific Dialogue involved a wide range of stakeholders including academia, civil society, government officials and regional civil servants, attending in a non-official capacity. Track Two diplomacy is an unofficial channel of dialogue that allows for more free and open discussion than is possible in official Track One or even Track 1.5 diplomacy. It is hoped that this inaugural Dialogue will build a foundation for future dialogues by promoting shared understanding on key issues, and thereby contributing to future official dialogues.

Day One

Session One: The Geo-Political Landscape in the Pacific

Speakers: Dr Van Jackson, Victoria University of Wellington

Dr Nicola Baker, USP

Dr Jackson focussed his remarks on the ways in which actors such as the U.S., China, Australia, and France are engaged in sphere-of-influence-making in the Pacific. These spheres of influence grant them control over the fates of some Pacific nations and suggested that China wants a sphere of influence for the purpose of a geographic buffer against U.S. primacy. Therefore, if the U.S. ‘wasn’t doing primacy’, China’s need for a sphere of influence would diminish. This, Dr Jackson noted, is a cause and consequence of militarism and a cause and consequence of the ‘securitisation of everything’. Dr Jackson noted that defence spending is surging and that the greater geostrategic concern is that the military-first choices being taken in Beijing and Washington, and to some extent Canberra, increase the risks of war in Asia which the Pacific could be dragged into.

Dr Baker focussed her remarks on the drivers of Australian, United States, and Chinese interests in the Pacific. First, she cited Australia’s fear of encirclement and noted how the China threat has been constructed and amplified in the Pacific islands context. She suggested Australia’s claims of Chinese military ambitions may be due to its own fear of encirclement by foreign powers in competition with its allies and protectors, together with another longstanding Australian fear – that of abandonment by their heavily-relied upon American ally. Second, Dr Baker stated Australian strategic anxieties drove U.S. concerns suggesting that Australia succeeded in its concerted campaign to convince the U.S. of Beijing’s malign strategic intent in the Pacific. U.S. engagement with the PICs is also a low-cost, low-risk way of showcasing US “successes” in its competition with China. Third, Dr Baker noted that while the Pacific region is portrayed as a locus of US-China competition, and it is clear that the US and its ally Australia are competing with China, the evidence that China is competing with the US is not compelling. Rather China’s interests are to persuade the independent Pacific states to support the One China policy and deny recognition to Taiwan, and to demonstrate China’s affinity with the interests of the developing world.

Key Points from the Discussion

Participants suggested that external partners have sometimes deliberately used summits in foreign capitals to skew regional positions – for example on the Indo Pacific strategy. Pacific island leaders should meet with each other before meeting collectively with foreign partners in their capitols.

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There is a lack of serious debate on geopolitical issues in Pacific countries to inform such dialogue and there is a need to be consistently involved in such discussion to ensure Pacific interests are reflected.

Concerns were raised about false narratives being pushed in the media and that media is shaping Pacific narratives. (This point was also made in session five on day two).

Participants noted that security in the Pacific also means food security and education, as well as working side by side with other countries (rather than in competition).

Session Two: Pacific Responses to Geostrategic Dynamics

Speakers: Dame Meg Taylor, Pacific Elders Group

Dr Gordon Nanau, USP

Dame Meg Taylor focussed her remarks on the competing geopolitical narratives in the Pacific and the implications for Pacific regionalism and unity. She noted, for example, that the AUKUS partnership caused unease within the region because it undermines our values as a community of nations seeking to achieve demilitarisation and a Nuclear-Free Pacific under the Treaty of Rarotonga. In the Pacific there is a continuous oscillation between unity and fragmentation; Pacific interests are varied, and so are bilateral relationships with external powers. These challenges are compounded by a complex regional architecture which is not politically or economically sovereign. For example, the Council of Regional Organizations in the Pacific (CROP) remains heavily reliant on external funds and former colonial powers sit as full members at Pacific decision-making tables. Colonisation, more broadly, is alive and well in the region. Dame Meg also considered the gaps and weaknesses at the state level including dependence on aid, internal factionalism which creates entry points for external actors, and the lack of a deep understanding of the importance of the security interests in the region. Fiji and Papua New Guinea have progressed from 'Friends to all, Enemies to None' to Active Selective Engagement, then Look North, suggesting that the Pacific is comfortable with universalism but this leads to a stage of vulnerability 'where the region gets played'. Dame Meg concluded by questioning if the non-aligned movement is 'dead and gone'.

Dr Gordon Nanau drew on comparisons with the Cold War era where we see a show of military might, competing values and world views. He stated that Pacific states and territories are finding ways to exploit the opportunities that accompany geo-political tensions in the region. However this has led to Pacific countries being forced to choose what side they are on (especially by traditional partners who are also prominent donors and supporters of our

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regional organisations). Dr Nanau asked the question: ‘What is the use of sovereignty and political independence when Pacific states are continuously being made to feel that they have to always consider the position of their traditional partners above their own local/national development needs?’ Dr Nanau argued that Pacific state’s responses to geopolitical dynamics in the region must be understood in the context of local needs and the domestic dynamics within respective countries and territories. He noted the negative representations of alternative worldviews or development paradigms (the neo-liberal versus neo-statist debate). Dr Nanau called for more research on the tangible work that each donor does in the Pacific to allow leaders to make more informed decisions at national and regional levels; and that regional institutions such as USP should be supported to enable research to be undertaken.

Key Points from the Discussion

The discussion canvassed the tension between geopolitics and development. It was suggested that traditional partners sometimes do not value decisions by Pacific leaders who are driven by the need to meet national priorities rather than geopolitical objectives (such as being aligned to China or Australia).

Participants noted that Pacific peoples are concerned about development not geopolitics. The case of China building a wharf in Luganville in Vanuatu was noted. For people in remote communities what mattered was ease of transportation of goods and to increase economic activities and livelihoods. People are not concerned about who builds the wharf. It was suggested that a return to human security commitments such as those outlined in the Boe Declaration on Regional Security was critical to ensure a focus on building Pacific Island states’ capacity to meet the needs of their people.

Participants called for the strengthening of national and regional institutions to help navigate geopolitical dynamics and mitigate the impact on domestic politics. Concerns were raised about the way geopolitics can exacerbate existing cleavages in domestic politics. The 2050 Strategy was referred to as the Pacific’s ‘North Star’. Questions were raised about the meaning of regionalism and there were calls for greater regional leadership. Similarly, there were calls to strengthen democratic systems and values and ensure these are conveyed to local and national leaders.

The ‘Friends to all, enemies to none’ position was presented as an effective means of strategic non-alignment.

Participants noted the ways in which geopolitics is manifesting including the contest for hearts and minds at the individual level.

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Participants highlighted the importance of Pacific values and asked “what values can the Pacific assert as *values that are important to us?*” For instance, it was suggested the new Government in Fiji is seeking a more value-based, principled way of engaging with Partners.

Session Three: The State of Military Activities in the Pacific

Speakers: Dr Kenneth Kuper, University of Guam

Mr Jose Sousa-Santos, Massey University

Dr Kuper focussed his remarks on the ways in which the U.S. military is shifting to a distributed and dispersed (D2) operating concept across Micronesia. This means spreading capabilities such as servicemen and military assets across a larger swathe of locations and operating environments (including Tinian and Palau). Essentially D2 is about being less predictable to your adversary and complicating their calculations by ‘expanding the target set’. This therefore also distributes risk. This is reflected in the Air Forces’ shift to Agile Combat Employment, where aircraft and equipment are dispersed between major hubs and smaller airfields at remote locations. At the end of the day, it becomes, “what do we do if Guam is compromised?” Dr Kuper outlined the military significance of Micronesia in United States defence policy, particularly that of strategic denial. Evidence suggests that Guam’s intended role is to be the first line of attack, rather than first line of defense. Dr Kuper argued that Micronesia is a critical litmus test when it comes to future conflict between the U.S. and China, particularly over Taiwan, suggesting that Guam will be on the front line of any kinetic conflict. “As goes Taiwan, so does Guam”. Dr Kuper noted examples of where Micronesian leaders have deliberately sought out U.S. defensive capabilities citing Palau’s request for Patriot missiles to be stationed in the country; a request which has been opposed by Palau’s Senate.

Mr Sousa-Santos highlighted the Pacific islands’ strategic significance as a site of geopolitical contestation between the United States and its allies and partners, including Australia, on the one hand and China on the other. He outlined the ways in which this was manifesting, warning that the Pacific islands would not be immune to any future conflict in Asia – in the South China Sea or over Taiwan. The potential impacts could range from the disruption to supply chains (such as experienced during the pandemic) to disinformation campaigns to shape public opinion. Impacts could also include heightened pressure to shape the strategic alignment of Pacific states through economic coercion or other forms of diplomatic pressure, to specific Pacific countries being drawn into efforts to secure strategic sea lines of communication (SLOC). As a result of the Pacific’s strategic significance, defence activities have increased significantly with Mr Sousa-Santos drawing on publicly available data collected by the *Pacific Defence Tracker* which has collated data across twelve types of defence activities between 2018 and 2023. This shows a significant increase in defence activities by Australia, United

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States and China – and to a lesser degree New Zealand and Japan. He noted that key focus areas are the maritime domain (IUU, HADR).

Key Points from the Discussion

The discussion focussed on two broad areas. First, the impact and implications of militarisation in and of the Pacific including the erosion of trust between the Pacific and their partners. In this regard there was discomfort about the actions of some traditional partners. Particularly concerning was the spread of the D2 concept beyond Micronesia to Australia and the South Pacific. It was highlighted that initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific narrative and AUKUS had not included engagement or consultation with Pacific leaders and this is contributing to a climate of distrust. There was a need for greater openness and candour – on all sides. Participants noted that there was a ‘push to arm’ trend in the Pacific (referring to the proposed standing up of a defence force in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) which had domestic civil-military implications. It was also noted that Pacific militaries have benefited from geopolitical competition.

Second, the discussion highlighted the nexus between militarisation and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The militarisation of humanitarian assistance was highlighted as a critical issue and concern, with participants noting that ‘it is easier to get boots on the ground rather than looking at the needs of local Pacific communities’. It was noted that there were positive regional examples of humanitarian action (ie RAMSI, Bougainville response) as well as the Pacific Islands Forum-led COVID-19 response, the Pacific Humanitarian Pathway which mobilised the region under the auspices of the Biketawa Declaration. It was also noted that the closure of international borders during COVID-19 demonstrated the importance of having regionally and locally-led solutions.

Session Four: Wrap Up Day One

The wrap up session for day one covered a range of topics summarised below:

- From a civil society perspective there is need for a distinct Pacific SIDS voice on these issues.
- There is a need for a regional ‘watchdog’ which provides deep analysis of military strategies and activities in the Pacific: a ‘defence tracker’.
- We need to pay more attention to what is happening in Micronesia; and for there to be more security dialogue between Micronesia and the rest of the Pacific islands.
- It was noted that the possibility of nuclear war is increasing rather than decreasing and the Pacific needs to be part of conversations with Australia, New Zealand and others.
- There is need to better understand how other regional groupings such as ASEAN navigate geopolitical dynamics.

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- Building Pacific capacity in such areas as defence logistics and engineering would provide ‘teeth’ to the position of non-alignment and ‘friends to all, enemies to none’.

DAY TWO

Session Five: Not Pawns: The Pacific’s Soft Power in the Face of Geostrategic Tensions

There were two speakers in this session. The first, Ms Sharon Bhagwan-Rolls from the Pacific Women Mediators Network, highlighted the need to consider how information regarding current geopolitical developments is spun or created. The media plays an important role in soft power strategies of international partners. There is an urgent need to build the capacity of national Pacific Island media organisations to research and produce content beyond the reproduction of outcome statements and press releases; to question, investigate and to communicate with Pacific Island communities. Pacific CSOs, including women peacebuilders, can also enhance the Pacific’s soft power by ensuring that decisions at the regional and national levels are informed by the Pacific’s own notions of peace and security. But there is a need to enhance access of Pacific CSOs including women peacebuilders to national government and regional processes.

The second speaker, Dr Milla Vaha from USP, described how soft power – the ability to influence and persuade others through the appeal of ideas, values and culture – was recognized as being a ‘small state tool’. The Pacific island states have been successful norm entrepreneurs, highlighting relationality with the ocean as well as the disproportionate impacts of climate change. Examples include the recent PIF Declaration on preserving maritime boundaries and the Tuvaluan assertion of permanent statehood: sovereignty in perpetuity. These innovative approaches are reminders that the Pacific states are not pawns. But the problem of soft power (as demonstrated by the recent Australia-Tuvalu agreement) is that it needs to be backed up by hard power. ‘Soft power hardly exists without hard power’.

In the subsequent discussion the following key points were raised:

We need to be mindful of how soft power is used by major powers to influence the Pacific and the different forms this influence takes (such as through radio stations, television, sports). In the current context of intensifying geopolitical competition, false narratives/misinformation are being deployed to bolster the soft power of some actors and undermine the soft power of others.

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The Pacific needs to recognize/acknowledge some prevailing contradictions within the region that undermine its moral authority and soft power potential. For example the women peace and security narrative is at odds with the reality that the Pacific has some of the world's highest levels of gender-based violence. Moreover there is a danger that for the Pacific, soft power will emphasize notions of vulnerability and victimhood, which only serves to highlight weakness.

One source of soft power for the region is our intellectual power. This has been utilized in negotiations such as the UNCLOS. But we could utilize this more fully: capitalizing on our global network and placing Pacific islanders in positions where they can frame and shape international rules and codes of conduct. This requires us to be cohesive and work collectively on the international stage.

Session Six: A Progressive Pacific Way: Alternatives to Status Quo Responses to Geopolitics?

The first speaker in this session, Ms Maureen Penjueli from the Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG), questioned whether the proposed Zone of Peace was seeking peace through deterrence or peace through non-proliferation and disarmament. The former approach would justify initiatives such as AUKUS as well as stepped up military partnerships and deployments. The latter would emphasise mediation, consensus, dialogue and anti/non-nuclear principles. It was suggested that the region would need to navigate questions of relationship, process, peace and religion as it seeks to advance this concept alongside the existing regional mechanisms – Boe Declaration, Treaty of Rarotonga and the 2050 Strategy.

The second speaker in the session, Dr Iati Iati from Victoria University Wellington, emphasized the need to interrogate the meaning of Pacific Way in the context of regional geopolitics. The current climate of heightened geopolitical contest has exposed tensions within the Pacific Way: namely between the values of non-interference and of regional unity. These tensions come to the fore when considering whether an individual Pacific island country may be free to make its own decisions about security partnerships without first going through regional institutions. It is important to question whose interests are served by calls to bring such decisions first to the PIF and to question the implications of a strengthened regional architecture for the non-interference principle.

The third and final speaker, Mr James Movick, spoke on the role of the Treaty of Rarotonga and whether it remains 'fit for purpose'. He suggested the Treaty did not accomplish what it had set out to do as a number of loopholes and exceptions were allowed. Notably it did not include the North Pacific and the freely associated states. It allows for transit of nuclear armed vessels. Monitoring by implementing authorities has not been consistent over time (only one

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meeting of state parties has been held). There is a need address these loopholes rather than establish an alternative treaty.

In the discussion that followed the following points were highlighted:

- The Treaty of Rarotonga remains a cornerstone for regional policy making on nuclear-related issues such as the Fukushima nuclear waste water discharge and AUKUS. A revitalized Treaty of Rarotonga (that addresses loopholes) together with the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) can be the basis for the zone of peace concept.
- There is a need to take control of the narratives of peace. For the Pacific region, what kind of peace does it want: peace through deterrence or peace through disarmament? Who decides? This links to the issue of strengthening the regional architecture and the notion of PIF centrality. To what extent is there space in this architecture for an independent Pacific voice, given the makeup and membership of the PIF? This links to the origins of the Pacific Way and its emphasis on regional self-determination.
- The non-sovereign Pacific needs to convene and talk about their stand as well. We should be wary of 'trojan horse syndrome'. How can the non-sovereign Pacific use their status to fight for Pacific interests? But also how can the independent Pacific support the further decolonization of the non-sovereign Pacific?

Session Seven: Next steps: The Pacific Dialogue

Led by Dr. Sandra Tarte from USP, Dr Anna Powles from Massey University and Mr Joel Nilon from the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, this session sought feedback from participants on what happens next. How to build an independent, Pacific owned and Pacific led Track Two process which is valuable and sustainable? Key outcomes of the discussion include the following:

- It was agreed there is a need for such a mechanism within the regional architecture that adds to the regional and national conversations about security. This Track Two process could contribute to the implementation of the 2050 Strategy, in particular its peace and security pillar. It could help provide intellectual focus/ coherence and feed information and critical analysis into Forum processes.

The focus of future dialogues was discussed. The concern of this particular dialogue is understanding geopolitics and militarism and how this impacts the region (its hard security and human security). These are topics not normally discussed at the PIF. Future Track Two Dialogues should keep this focus on geopolitics but could consider

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other topics within this geopolitical framework. Suggested areas of focus included geoeconomics as well as the nexus between geopolitical posturing to secure spheres of influence and internal conflicts/domestic security in Pacific island countries.

- USP should remain the hub and convenor, potentially utilizing its regional campuses but also partnering with the University of Papua New Guinea and the University of Guam. As a CROP agency USP has the credentials and legitimacy to take this forward.
- There was discussion around the prospects of institutionalizing the Track Two Dialogue: the possible need for a secretariat, the question of funding, how to socialize the process with regional/Government officials (Chatham House rules) and who to include. The importance of CSO engagement was emphasized and as well as how to engage others (ie outside powers) with whom we want to have these conversations. There was also some consideration of intersessional activities over the coming year.

Session Eight: Open forum: Feedback from participants

In the closing session participants reflected on the value and significance of the Dialogue. For some, value lay in reaffirming the relevance of Pacific geopolitics to regional security and to the everyday issues of people in the region. For others what was significant was the opportunity for conversations across the region (including with the non-independent territories of Micronesia where traditional security threats loom large). There was also recognition of the value of cross-fertilization of ideas between officials, CSO and academia. Participants highlighted the need for younger Pacific scholars to be engaged in these conversations and to build awareness of the regional context. Some emphasized the importance of maintaining the independence of the process, the need to be results oriented and to be able to measure effectiveness.

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Appendix 1: Track Two Pacific Dialogue Programme

Monday 4th – Tuesday 5th December 2023

Venue: SBM Conference Room, USP Campus

Day One: Monday 4th December

9:00 – 10:00am Opening session: Welcome and overview

Speakers: Professor Jito Vanualailai, USP Deputy Vice Chancellor Education
 Dr Brian Jones, British High Commissioner to Fiji

Chair: Dr Sandra Tarte, USP

All: Introductions

10:00 – 10:30am Morning Tea (venue: SBM Courtyard)

10:30 – 11:30am Session One: The Geo-Political Landscape in the Pacific

Speakers: Dr Van Jackson, Victoria University of Wellington
 Dr Nikki Baker, USP

Chair: Dr Anna Powles, Massey University

11:30 – 12:30pm Session Two: Pacific Responses to Geostategic Dynamics

Speakers: Dame Meg Taylor, Pacific Elders Group
 Dr Gordon Nanau, USP

Chair: Dr Sandra Tarte, USP

12:30 – 2:00pm Lunch (SBM Courtyard)

2:00 – 3:30 pm Session Three: The State of Military Activities in the Pacific

Speakers: Mr Jose Sousa-Santos (Massey University)
 Dr Kenneth Kuper (University of Guam)

Chair: Mr James Movick

3:30 – 4:00pm Afternoon Tea

4:00 – 5:00pm Session Four: Wrap Up Day One

All participants. Open Discussion.

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Chair: Dr Anna Powles

6:00 – 9:00pm **Dinner hosted by Dr Brian Jones, British High Commissioner to Fiji**
(venue High Commission residence)

Day Two: Tuesday 5th December

9:00 – 10:30am **Session Five: Not Pawns: The Pacific's Soft Power in the Face of Geostrategic Tensions**

Speakers: Ms Sharon Bhagwan-Rolls, Pacific Women Mediators Network

Dr Milla Vaha, USP

Chair: Dr Anna Powles, Massey University

10:30-11:00am **Morning Tea (SBM Courtyard)**

11:00am – 12:30pm **Session Six: A Progressive Pacific Way: Alternatives to Status Quo Responses to Geopolitics?**

Speakers: Ms Maureen Penjueli, Pacific Network on Globalisation

Dr Iati Iati, Victoria University

Mr James Movick

Chair: Dr Sandra Tarte, USP

12:30 – 1:30pm **Lunch (SBM Courtyard)**

1:30 – 2:30pm **Session Seven: Next steps: The Pacific Dialogue**

Speakers: Dr Sandra Tarte and Dr Anna Powles

Chair: Mr Joel Nilon, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat

2:30 – 4:00pm **Session Eight: Open forum: Feedback from participants**

Chair: Mr James Movick

4:00 - 4:30pm **Closing of The Pacific Dialogue**

Speaker: Mr Joel Nilon, PIFS

6:00 – 8.00pm **Dinner at Malolo Café, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat**

Appendix 2: List of Dialogue Participants (alphabetical order)

Dr. Nicola Baker	University of the South Pacific
Ms Sharon Bhagwan-Rolls	Pacific Women Mediators Network
HE Ms Viranria Brown	High Commissioner of Vanuatu to Fiji
Mr Michael Crowe	Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
HE Aliioaiga Feturi Elisaia	High Commissioner of Samoa to Fiji
Dr Lorenz Gonschor	University of the South Pacific
Dr Iati Iati	Victoria University of Wellington
Dr Van Jackson	Victoria University of Wellington
Dr Kenneth Kuper	University of Guam
Mr Leonard Louma	Melanesian Spearhead Group
Mr Solomone Momoivalu	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fiji
Mr James Movick	Pacific Fusion Centre
Dr Gordon Nanau	University of the South Pacific
Mr Joel Nilon	Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
Ms Maureen Penjueli	Pacific Network on Globalization
Dr Anna Powles	Massey University
Mr Jose Sousa-Santos	Massey University
Dr Sandra Tarte	University of the South Pacific
Dame Meg Taylor	Pacific Elders Group
Dr Milla Vaha	University of the South Pacific

Notetakers

Ms Lavinia Tomtavala	Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
Ms Gayle Manuelli	Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat